



THE FACULTY OFFICE ANNUAL RULE OF LAW LECTURE 2025

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"I WILL ACT UPRIGHTLY AND JUSTLY": NOTARIES PUBLIC, THE RULE OF LAW AND ETHICAL INTEGRITY

Introduction

Developments in modern professional practice bring many expectations and challenges. Increasing public and media concern about the rule of law and ethical integrity shine a light on many of the grey areas of professional decision-making and actions.

In this lecture, I seek to explore the regulatory and ethical background of these various issues and challenges, as well as the nature and drivers of ethical responses. I shall also reflect on their effects and consequences for the rule of law and the notary's oath set out in section 7 of the Public Notaries Act 1843 to "act uprightly and justly".

The Legal Services Act 2007

I hardly need to remind this audience that, under the Legal Services Act 2007, notaries are required to be authorised by the Master of the Faculties before they can carry on notarial activities in England & Wales.¹ These activities are defined in a somewhat circular way as activities which were customarily carried on by notaries before the Act.²

However, because notaries might also have carried on other activities that became reserved under the Act, reserved instrument activities, probate activities, and the administration of oaths, were expressly excluded from the notarial authorisation.³ They require separate authorisation, though the Master is an approved regulator for these activities, too.⁴

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1. Sections 12(1)(e), 18 and Sch. 2.

2. Sch. 2, para 7(1).

3. Sch. 2, para 7(2).

4. Sch. 4, para 1, Table.

More importantly for the purposes of this lecture, the 2007 Act contains regulatory objectives that the regulators are under a duty to promote.⁵ These objectives are set out in section 1 and include protecting and promoting the public interest, supporting the constitutional principle of the rule of law, and improving access to justice.

The objectives also specifically include promoting and maintaining adherence to the five professional principles⁶, four of which are expressed to apply to authorised persons.⁷ The first three address acting with independence and integrity, acting in the best interests of clients, and maintaining proper standards of work. The fourth addresses the duty to the court for those authorised persons who exercise rights of audience or conduct litigation,⁸ but the Master is not approved to authorise notaries to carry these on.⁹ The fifth is a general principle that the affairs of clients should be kept confidential, and it is not limited to authorised persons.¹⁰

Now, the regulatory objectives apply to regulators, not to practitioners. It is therefore usual to find elements of the objectives and the professional principles repeated in the regulators' codes of conduct. In this way, these statutory expectations are translated into enforceable professional obligations.

But let me pause at this point to highlight that the Act has therefore placed particular emphasis on some very important factors. These are: the public interest; the rule of law; the interests of justice and of access to it; the best interests of clients; independence and integrity; and client confidentiality. These are all fundamental to the trust and confidence that the public should be able to place in legal services and those who provide them.

The Notaries Practice Rules

We can then turn to the Notaries Practice Rules of 2019 for the specific expression of the Act's expectations as applied to notaries. I shall not review the entire code here but, consistent with the Act's expectations, we can see in Practice Rule 4 the obligation on notaries to uphold the rule of law and the proper administration of justice, to act with integrity, to maintain independence and impartiality, and to act in a way that maintains the trust in notaries that the public may reasonably expect.

Further, in Practice Rule 7, we find an obligation not to do anything as a notary that does or is likely to compromise or impair either the notary's ability to act in the best interests of the client or the good repute of the notary or the notarial profession.

In summary, then, the regulatory objectives and professional principles in the Act that are most relevant to the status and work of notaries all seem to be covered in the Practice Rules. Or are they?

5. Sections 3 and 28.

6. Section 1(1)(h).

7. Section 1(3).

8. Section 1(3)(d).

9. The rationale for this exclusion would seem to be because a notary is "an impartial public official whose object is the *prevention* of litigation": cf. Lightowler & Hewitt (2023), emphasis supplied.

10. Section 1(3)(e).

There is one, possibly striking, omission from the Notaries Practice Rules. There is no explicit mention of the public interest. Nor does it appear in the Code of Practice. But – strangely, you may think, given my known focus on the importance and primacy of the public interest¹¹ – this omission does not unduly concern me in the case of notaries.

Let me explain. First, I would say that there is a clue in the description ‘notary *public*’. Of its very nature, this is an appointment to a public office, with an associated duty to the public in general.¹² In this sense, the *principally public nature* of the role of a notary stands in contrast to the largely private status of other legal professionals – even though those professionals might also owe duties to the public.

Second, therefore, the nature of the notarial profession fits completely with the notion of a ‘public profession’ that I advanced last year in my third report for the Independent Review of Legal Services Regulation.¹³ That is to say, the privilege of being treated as a profession is granted by or on behalf of the public; in return, the profession is *expected* to serve society and to put the public interest ahead of clients’ interests and of any self-interest of individual practitioners, their firms or their profession.

Notaries and the rule of law

Third, in my definition of ‘the public interest’ (also in that third report¹³), I refer to two elements: the fabric of society, and the legitimate participation of citizens in that society. In relation to legal services, the fabric of society is perhaps most strongly expressed by two aspects of the duty that feature in Practice Rule 4.2.1: upholding the rule of law and the proper administration of justice. This duty is described in the Code of Practice as “the foremost and overriding professional duty of any lawyer”. As an expression of key elements of the public interest, I fully agree.

My second element of the public interest, the legitimate participation of citizens in society, is just as important as the first. In my terms, there can be no legitimate participation by citizens if the powerful act to deny or undermine legal rights and access to them in ways that destroy the very basis of that participation. That could not reflect respect for the rule of law, but is more akin to a war of attrition. This reflects the view I also adopted in my public interest report¹³ last year, namely, that living under the rule of law means that law “will restrain all arbitrary exercises of power” (including, I would say, by lawyers in the supposed pursuit of their clients’ interests).

Notaries might not be authorised in that capacity to conduct litigation or exercise rights of audience in legal proceedings. Nevertheless, as a recent article by Michael Lightowler and Jonathan Hewitt puts it, they do “play a niche but important role in the administration of justice in England and Wales”.¹⁴ This function lies in supporting the rule of law, perhaps not so much in the enforcement or vindication of legal rights through litigation but in relation to

11. Cf. Mayson (2020) and (2024).

12. I note that this position is also recognised in Europe: the Council of Europe, in Article 25 of its Code of Notary Ethics (2021), states that notaries are “public servants holding public authority”.

13. See Mayson (2024).

14. Lightowler & Hewitt (2023).

the role of a notary as “an impartial public official whose object is the *prevention of litigation*”.¹⁵

Equally though, as these authors go on to explain: “In some circumstances, notaries also play a role in the enforcement of obligations by verifying and making records of non-compliance with an existing agreement ... that is then used by a claimant as evidence in court proceedings.”¹⁴

In these respects, the notary contributes to upholding the rule of law. Preventing litigation, and verifying evidence, both shape the behaviour of those who stand in a more powerful position in relation to others and curb potentially arbitrary actions.

Also relevant to legitimate participation by citizens is the reference in the Practice Rules to a person’s freedom to instruct a notary of their choice, and to a notary’s duty of care to persons in all jurisdictions who may place legitimate reliance on notarial acts. This ability to engage with confidence in notarised transactions is a significant contributor to participation. As Michael Lightowler and Jonathan Hewitt have again explained:¹⁴

When creating their records (‘notarial acts’), the notary also seeks to verify and authenticate matters such as the identity of the parties appearing before them, their authority to do so, [and] their capacity, free will and understanding of the nature and effect of what they are doing. In this way, the notary’s act creates legal certainty in the form of reliable documentary evidence of the informed and voluntary participation of a party in a legal act or transaction.

Because of this, these factors also become the bedrock of effective and reliable commercial transactions. The importance to the UK economy of international trade is itself, for me, another key element of the public interest. Again, therefore, we can see the clear contribution and importance of the work of the notarial profession to the public interest. And these are all facets of the rule of law in action.

The role of notaries in relation to the public interest is therefore clear and fundamental. In all the respects in which it matters, the notary’s professional obligations are fully aligned with the protection and promotion of the public interest. They are inherent and integral. Arguably, an explicit reference to the public interest in the rules is not necessary. As professionals, notaries put their obligation to the public, and to the integrity of their public notarial acts, ahead of any client or personal interests.

Put another way, a notary’s duty to the transaction and to the public necessarily incorporates fidelity to the public interest. Nevertheless – as we lawyers might say, “for the avoidance of doubt” – I might invite the Faculty Office to reflect on this omission of the public interest in any future review of the Notaries Practice Rules!

The public interest and clients’ best interests

Practice Rule 7.3 requires notaries not to compromise or impair their ability to act in the best interests of their clients. This is consistent with the professional principle in section 1 of the 2007 Act, and is in similar terms to the obligations imposed on other authorised persons by their regulators.

15. Lightowler & Hewitt (2023), emphasis supplied.

In addition, regulators are usually very clear that where there is or might be a conflict between a client's best interests and the public interest, the public interest must prevail (particularly in relation to the rule of law, duties to the court, or public trust and confidence). Unfortunately, despite this clarity, there have been many recent instances of lawyers elevating their duty to the client above that of their wider duty to the public interest.

Such over-association with clients and their objectives not only raises challenging questions about the proper role of legal representatives but also raises eyebrows in the court of public opinion. Adopting the touchstone of a 'public profession', trust and confidence cannot be demanded or expected but must be earned in a reciprocal fashion – whether the lawyer in question is in private practice or employed.

The prospect of over-association with clients is often thought to be strong where the client is also the lawyer's employer. In 2023, a thematic review of in-house lawyers by the Solicitors Regulation Authority¹⁶ revealed how many of them were concerned that their professional independence was not recognised or respected, or had felt pressured to compromise their regulatory duties or professional ethics.

As solicitors and their regulator wrestle with the best ways to address these challenges to professionalism, we find that the notarial profession offers a valuable steer. There (in Notaries Practice Rule 11.2) are two eminently practical suggestions, already years old and (in my view) just waiting to be adopted by other regulators. First, there is a requirement to ensure that independence and integrity are fully recognised in writing in any contract of employment. And second, there is also a requirement on an employed notary to send to their employer an annual written statement of professional independence (in an approved form) and to declare in the application for a practising certificate that this has been done. Note that these are regulatory requirements in the practice rules, not merely suggested guidance on best practice.

In sum, the Notaries Practice Rules make it very clear that independence and integrity in the discharge of the notary's public interest obligations override any preferences or contrary expectations that any client or employer might have.

Ethical challenges for notaries

Let me turn to contemplate what might be ethical challenges for notaries. First, we might ask: is there a problem? And on the face of it, we might reasonably think not.

Within the public consciousness, as I mentioned earlier, there are increasing concerns about lawyers' ethics. These concerns arise from the facilitation of kleptocracy¹⁷; from the use of strategic or abusive litigation or non-disclosure agreements intended to suppress revelations or investigation of possibly improper activity by clients; and from the rather questionable behaviour and tactics that have emerged during the public inquiry into the Post Office Horizon technology and its manifest failings. However, there is barely any association of notaries with the disquiet arising from these activities.

16. Available at: <https://www.sra.org.uk/sra/research-publications/in-house-solicitors-thematic-review/>.

17. Cf. Institute of Business Ethics (2025).

In the economic crime context, notarial services could be exploited for money laundering through, say, notaries willingly or unknowingly verifying forged documents to help clients obtain overseas bank accounts. In addition, high-risk professional services in which notaries might also be engaged include conveyancing, trust and company services, and managing client accounts.

The latest legal services threat assessment published by the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation¹⁸ mentions notaries only in the context of them and their services being subject to UK financial sanctions legislation. Again, it contains nothing specifically about notaries being in that capacity the evidenced source of threats to sanctions compliance.

Turning to disciplinary action, there are only two or three cases against notaries each year. In a profession of around 750, that represents a rate of up to 0.4% (1 in 250 practitioners). Gratifyingly low, you might think. But let us add a comparative perspective.

Statistics from the Solicitors Regulation Authority suggest that in 2022/23 disciplinary action was taken against solicitors in about 800 cases. In a profession of around 160,000, that is a rate of 0.5% (1 in 200 practitioners). Given the much larger number, and wider range, of solicitors' practices, as well as their greater exposure to client money, I'm inclined to wonder whether we might have expected a much greater differential between the two professions.

The conditions for unethical behaviour

All this noted, there seems little doubt that practice in the twenty-first century does bring more acute, and more public, ethical eggshells on which to walk. Reflecting these pressures, earlier this year the Faculty Office published a very helpful interim legal ethics study on professional judgement.¹⁹ It draws on other work but reminds us that the drivers of unethical conduct are the 3Cs of character, context, and capacities.

These factors are all dimensions of the *risk* of unethical behaviour, not pointers to the *inevitability* of it. I am therefore going to suggest this evening that something else is needed in the analysis to help us understand how that risk is transformed into professional misconduct.

The first C, character, is founded on values and principles, and may be the initial source of any disposition to behave properly or improperly. We probably think of character as innate, something within ourselves.

The first thing that strikes me is that, within character, we must surely hope to see a basis for recognising right from wrong. In other words, an individual's character should incorporate values that *could* distinguish the ethical from the unethical. But, of course, if an individual lacks a moral compass, without more they might be tempted to veer towards the unethical. In this sense, character and values focus on the *internal* '*beliefs*' part of ethical behaviour that could predispose someone towards or against particular actions.

So, yes, character is internal, but rather than being innate I think it is more helpful to see it as *internalised*. I say this because I have a firm belief that values and behaviour are heavily

18. See OFSI (2025).

19. See Faculty Office (2025).

influenced by the second C of *context*. This influence happens over time and in different circumstances, such as family, education and workplace.

Next, therefore, whatever an individual's values – whether veering towards or away from the ethical – 'the rules' can also prescribe or proscribe certain actions or behaviours. These rules include social norms and expectations, as well as the law and professional codes of conduct. They are also part of context, and can exist independently of – or even be contrary to – certain personal beliefs. As such, these rules are about the *external 'doing'* part of ethical behaviour.

Ideally, within a profession, an individual's values will align with the professional rules such that believing and doing correspond. But all too often, I have seen individuals' values and behaviour moulded – warped, even – by their organisational environment and influences. Good people can do bad things. For employed lawyers, including notaries, the ethical culture (or, as it is sometimes described, the 'ethical infrastructure') of their employer can have a profound impact on their daily actions.

The legal services sector unfortunately abounds with stories of the aberrant behaviour caused by context. These include, for instance, the use of hours or billing targets, the conditions for a bonus, the stress of heavy workloads, or the pressure to cover up mistakes. If these contextual factors lead to actions that would not otherwise have occurred, how can anyone possibly claim that they have *not* 'compromised or impaired their ability' to act in accordance with their professional obligations?

Other contextual factors can distort professional behaviour, too. These include over-association with clients or their causes, as well as circumstances at home (such as illness, bereavement, or relationship breakdown). All of these factors carry the *potential* for unethical decision-making – and possibly even increase the risk of it.

For these reasons, we need to be mindful of the interplay between these two Cs of character and context. For example, dishonesty is certainly on the darker side of character. The Faculty Office interim study shows that dishonesty, driven by the prospect of financial gain or the need to cover up errors or mistakes, was the most likely form of unethical conduct in cases leading to judgements in the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in 2023 and 2024.

In potential lessons for notaries, such misconduct appears to be more likely in sole practitioner and small firms, as well as in organisations where there is pressure to meet the sort of targets and expectations to which I have already referred. Again, context proves to be important and influential.

The third C is *capacities*. These are (as the Faculty Office interim study puts it) knowledge of the rules and how the individual may reason when faced with an ethical dilemma. In this context, I would say that 'the rules' should be seen as a broad range of regulatory and professional duties and expectations. It is disappointing, then, that the Legal Services Board appears to take a much narrower view. In its draft statement of policy on upholding professional ethical duties, it limits its definition of those duties to just the professional principles in section 1 of the Act.²⁰

20. See Legal Services Board (2025).

Whatever the scope, knowledge, education and guidance on matters of professional ethics are clearly important. I accept, though, that the professional rules might exist and yet not be known (or at least not be sufficiently well known) by an individual practitioner.

But I will assume, for the moment, that the rules are known – with an aside that, as a member of a public profession, I would regard it as a core duty for an individual to know exactly what the rules are. However, even when they are known, they still need to be *applied* to the context in which an ethical decision falls to be made.

The capacity to reason then becomes critical. It assumes that the answer to an ethical decision might not lie clearly in character and values, or in 'the rules'. As we have seen, it is affected by a range of contextual circumstances, influences, and the preferences of others (including clients, employers and colleagues).

The capacity to reason is the ability to think logically, to seek and assess available facts, to understand alternatives and (so far as possible) others' motivations, and to balance conflicting views. It can also be expressed as 'professional judgement'. The critical issue here lies not so much in the *absence* of knowledge or understanding of the rules; it requires the *presence* of the capacity to reason. Education and guidance alone cannot guarantee the right outcome.

So my difficulty here is that the *capacity* to reason is not the same thing as the *exercise* of it. It seems to me that paying attention to character, context and capacities only takes us to 'base camp' in making or supporting effective ethical decisions. The further on one goes, the more rarefied and challenging the ethical atmosphere can become.

The question is: what can turn predisposition or circumstances (or both) into the conditions that lead to someone falling over the ethical precipice? I must admit that I am not an ethicist or moral philosopher – at least not until I have had two or more glasses of a fine red wine! So while I venture from base camp with caution and beyond the three Cs, I nevertheless want to offer some further thoughts.

Ethical responses

The personal history and determinants of each the first two Cs of character and context are undoubtedly very important in any consideration of ethical influences and decision-making. Also, professional rules and codes of conduct become part of the context within which professionals practise. And when internalised as knowledge, they may also play a role in shaping character. But of themselves, neither character nor context is certain to predetermine either ethical or unethical behaviour.

For the most part, I think that at any given point when a professional ethical decision falls to be made, we can take all three Cs of character, context and capacities as given – that is, these become in effect close to fixed points of reference. The individual will know their own character and the values on which it is based. Their context or circumstances will be set: for example, the state of being a sole practitioner, or practising in a small firm, or having stretching targets. The individual will (as we must assume) know the rules.

Similarly, the capacity to understand the rules and to reason effectively does not guarantee ethicality. It is possible that, under certain circumstances, neither understanding nor reason might be brought to bear on a decision, or that both might fail.

So my conclusion here is that something more is needed for our analysis. My proposition this evening is that, for ethical behaviour to prevail, the three Cs must also lead to particular consequences. If any one of those consequences does not follow, there cannot be an unethical outcome. These consequences relate to opportunity, motivation and resolve.

The first consideration then, in my view, is the consequence of *context*. It strikes me that if the prevailing circumstances offer no *opportunity* for an unethical outcome, there will be no ethical choice to be made. Consider, for example, where the firm does not hold client money or offer bonuses. There is nothing for ethicality or the lack of it to act on.

But if the context does offer opportunity (say, for illicit personal gain, or for a bonus or promotion), the second consideration is whether there is the *motivation* to benefit from the opportunity presented. Again, if there is no motivation to benefit or behave unethically, misconduct will not follow.

It seems to me that motivation could be driven either by character (certain inner beliefs to act in a particular way) or by context (external obligations or incentives to do so). In the interests of time, let me assume that malign values can be set on one side for my purposes this evening – not least because I do not see how they can be compatible with membership of a public profession. It is why many professions have a ‘fit and proper person’ threshold for entry to their ranks.

This would largely mean that incentives arising from context are the principal, potentially unethical, element that we must guard against. The influence of an organisation’s ethical infrastructure is therefore worthy of particular attention and assessment – and is why entity regulation is so important. The possibility of, say, a bonus or a promotion might well be capable of motivating someone of otherwise impeccable *character* to behave unethically – of external incentive overriding inner belief.

Even if there is motivation, though, the question is still: *will it be acted on?*

By this point, the third and final consideration is the consequence arising from *capacities*. As I see it, this consequence is *resolve* or rather, here, the lack of it (and it might also be expressed as willpower or self-discipline, I suppose). Values say no; the rules say no; but opportunity and motivation tend to yes: what tips the behaviour away from the unethical is the strength of the resolve to resist. If there is a failure of resolve, misconduct will take place; if resolve is strong, it will not.

Consequently, it is not merely the *capacity* to reason that is critical when faced with an ethical decision. It is the strength to *exercise* that reason to reach a principled conclusion that can be justified – and, if need be, explained. For notaries, let me suggest that this justification must be that the reasoned conclusion is consistent with the oath to act uprightly and justly.

The golden thread

Where, then, might all this lead us? Let me end with some thoughts about how ethical behaviour, the rule of law and the notarial oath are tied together by what, for me, is a ‘golden thread’.

I have stressed the importance of the role of notaries to the rule of law, to the certainty and integrity of transactions, and in their contribution to international trade (which are all so vital

to the public interest, the growth agenda, and the standing of UK legal professions and the legal system).

Regulatory obligations to uphold the rule of law, to act with integrity, to maintain independence and impartiality, and to act in the best interests of clients are not some statements of 'nice to have' if the exigencies of the day job allow them. They are fundamental – foundational – to the very essence of being a legal professional. These are the higher objective values that form the obligations of a public profession.¹³

They will not always align with each other or even appear to be reconcilable – for instance, when a client's expressed intentions are not compatible with the law, or with the rules of court, or with respecting the rights and dignity of third parties, and so on. This is when the exercise of the capacity to reason, as a member of a public profession, should lead to the conclusion that the client cannot have their way *and must be told so*.

To do otherwise would clearly be inconsistent with the obligations of a public profession to serve the public interest and the rule of law; and it would be inconsistent with acting ethically and independently.

The rule of law cannot be maintained if citizens are advised, enabled or allowed to act in ways that are inconsistent with it. This might seem a rather trite statement to make; but we have seen too many instances in recent years of lawyers pursuing client interest to the exclusion of all else – even to the edge of legality, good practice and civility (and sometimes even over the edge).

If we cannot rely on the legal professions to respect, promote and maintain the rule of law, then it is not hyperbole to suggest that democracy itself is at risk. The rule of law cannot be supported without completely ethical legal professions that enjoy the trust and confidence of the public whose interests they are expected to protect and serve.

The valuable interim study of the Faculty Office emphasises that ethical behaviour is founded on the 3Cs of character, context and capacities. Building on that work, I have sought here to show that acting ethically is not simply a matter of being consistent with one's own values (or character): I can *believe* in my values but still choose to *act* unethically. Nor is it simply a question of knowing the professional rules: again, I can *know* what the rules say (especially when they are clear and unambiguous) but still choose to *act* unethically.

I have therefore further proposed that context must also have created an *opportunity* to behave unethically, and that character or context must have generated the *motivation* to act on that opportunity. A knowledge of the professional rules should be sufficient to determine whether or not any particular course of action would be consistent with those rules. But I have also suggested that the final determinant of ethical behaviour lies in the strength of individual *resolve*, based on the capacity to reason.

Finally, therefore, let me claim that the exercise of this capacity to reason must draw its inspiration and strength from a commitment to the higher and overriding values of a public profession. For me, this commitment is nowhere more succinctly articulated than in the notary's oath: "to act uprightly and justly". By referring to 'acting', it is focused on behaviour: it might be informed by beliefs, rules, and intentions, but it is focused on their physical manifestation and outcomes.

And by focusing on being upright and just, it encapsulates the outcomes of fidelity to the rule of law, to independence and integrity, and to the (objectively and impartially considered) best interests of the client. It is in fulfilling their oath that notaries can maintain the public's trust in individual notaries and in their profession as a whole.

The golden thread starts with the commitment that a member of a public profession must have to the public interest; it passes to the resolve that must flow from it to act ethically in accordance with that membership and in ways that are upright and just; and it is a thread that should touch all persons, at all times, and in all circumstances.

It presents both a privilege and an onerous, but necessary, duty of ethical integrity. Without it, there is no guarantee of consistently ethical professional behaviour. And without that, there is no real prospect of living meaningfully and securely under the rule of law.

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